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ABSTRACT
Most central banks perceive a trade-off between stabilizing inflation and stabilizing the gap
between output and desired output. However, the standard new Keynesian framework implies no
such trade-off. In that framework, stabilizing inflation is equivalent to stabilizing the welfare-
relevant output gap. In this paper, we argue that this property of the new Keynesian framework,
which we call the "divine coincidence", is due to a special feature of the model: the absence of non
trivial real imperfections. 
We focus on one such real imperfection, namely, real wage rigidities. When the baseline new
Keynesian model is extended to allow for real wage rigidities, the divine coincidence disappears, and
central banks indeed face a trade-off between stabilizing inflation and stabilizing the welfare-relevant
output  gap.  We  show  that  not  only  does  the  extended  model  have  more  realistic  normative
implications, but it also has appealing positive properties. In particular, it provides a natural














jgali@mit.eduA standard new Keynesian (NK) model has emerged. On the supply side, it
consists of Calvo price and/or wage staggering. On the demand side, it is com-
posed of an Euler equation and a Taylor rule. With more explicit microeconomic
foundations than its Keynesian ancestor, and more relevance than its RBC pre-
decessor, it has become the workhorse in discussions of °uctuations, policy, and
welfare.
A central, albeit controversial, block in this standard framework is the so-called
New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC), which, in its simple form, has the fol-
lowing representation:
¼ = ¯ E¼(+1) + · (y ¡ y¤) (1)
where ¼ is in°ation, y is (log) output, y¤ is (log) natural output, and (y ¡ y¤)
is the output gap. The e®ects of changes in factors such as the price of oil or
the level of technology appear through their e®ects on natural output y¤.
From a welfare point of view, the model implies that it is desirable to stabilize
in°ation and to stabilize the output gap. Equation (1) implies that the two
goals do not con°ict: Stabilizing in°ation also stabilizes the output gap. Thus,
for example, in response to an increase in the price of oil, the best policy is
to keep in°ation constant; doing so implies that output remains equal to its
natural level.1
This property, which we shall call the divine coincidence contrasts with a wide-
spread consensus on the undesirability of policies that seek to fully stabilize
in°ation at all times and at any cost in terms of output. That consensus under-
lies the medium-term orientation adopted by most in°ation targeting central
banks.
In this paper, we show that this divine coincidence is tightly linked to a speci¯c
property of the standard NK model, namely the fact that the gap between the
natural level of output and the e±cient (¯rst-best) level of output is constant
and invariant to shocks. This feature implies that stabilizing the output gap|
the gap between actual and natural output|is equivalent to stabilizing the
welfare-relevant output gap|the gap between actual and e±cient output. This
equivalence is the source of the divine coincidence: The NKPC implies that
1. See, e.g., Goodfriend and King (1997) for discussion of the case for price stability associated
with the new Keynesian model.
2stabilization of in°ation is consistent with stabilization of the output gap. The
constancy of the gap between natural and e±cient output implies in turn that
stabilization of the output gap is equivalent to stabilization of the welfare-
relevant output gap.
The property just described can in turn be traced to the absence of non trivial
real imperfections in the standard NK model. This leads us to introduce one
such real imperfection, namely real wage rigidities. The existence of real wage
rigidities has been pointed to by many authors as a feature needed to account
for a number of labor market facts (see, for example, Hall [2005]). We show that,
once the NK model is extended in this way, the divine coincidence disappears.
The reason is that the gap between natural and e±cient output is no longer
constant, and is now a®ected by shocks. Stabilizing in°ation is still equivalent
to stabilizing the output gap, but no longer equivalent to stabilizing the welfare-
relevant output gap. Thus, it is no longer desirable from a welfare point of view.
Stabilization of in°ation and stabilization of the welfare-relevant output gap
now present the monetary authority with a trade-o®. In the face of an adverse
supply shocks, in particular, the monetary authority must decide whether to
accommodate a higher level of in°ation or, instead, keep in°ation constant but
allow for a larger decline in the welfare-relevant output gap.
While we focus on the implications of real wage rigidities, we see our results
as an example of a more general proposition. The optimal design of macroeco-
nomic policy depends very much on the interaction between real imperfections
and shocks. In the standard NK model these interactions are limited. In partic-
ular, the size of real distortions is either constant or varies over time in response
to exogenous shocks to the distorting variables themselves (e.g. tax rates). This
has strong implications for policy, one of them being the lack of a trade-o® in
response to most shocks, including conventional supply shocks. In reality, distor-
tions are likely to interact with shocks, leading to di®erent policy prescriptions.
In our model, this interaction works through endogenous variations in wage
markups, resulting from the sluggish adjustment of real wages. However, this
is not the only possible mechanism: a similar interaction could work, for exam-
ple, through the endogenous response of desired price markups to shocks, as in
Rotemberg and Woodford (1996). Understanding these interactions should be
high on macroeconomists' research agendas.2
2. See Gal¶ ³, Gertler, and L¶ opez-Salido (2005) for some evidence suggesting the presence of
3At the same time, we see the extension of the NK model to incorporate real
wage rigidities as more than an example of this general proposition. We believe
that real wage rigidities are high on the list of real imperfections a®ecting
cyclical °uctuations. In fact, as we discuss below, the introduction of real wage
rigidities overcomes a well known empirical weakness of the standard NK model
(as represented in equation (1 )), namely, its lack of in°ation inertia|which
we de¯ne as the degree of in°ation persistence beyond that inherited from the
output gap (y¡y¤) itself. We show that real wage rigidities are a natural source
of in°ation inertia, and can account for the good empirical ¯t of traditional
Phillips curve equations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 we lay out a baseline
new Keynesian model, with staggered price setting and no labor market dis-
tortions, and use it to illustrate the shortcomings discussed above. In Section
2 we introduce real wage rigidities, and show how their presence generates a
meaningful trade-o® between stabilization of in°ation and the welfare-relevant
output gap. Section 3 looks at the implications of alternative stabilization poli-
cies. Section 4 looks at the costs of disin°ation. Section 5 relates our results
to the literature. Section 6 derives some empirical relations between in°ation,
unemployment and observable supply shocks implied by our framework, and
provides some evidence on its ability to ¯t the data. Section 7 concludes.
1 The Standard New Keynesian Model
The baseline framework below is standard, with one exception: In order to
discuss \supply shocks" we introduce a non-produced input, with exogenous
supply M. We interpret shocks to M as supply shocks. For simplicity, we leave
out technological shocks, but, in our model, they would have exactly the same
implications as supply shocks. The only di®erence, relevant when going to the
data, is that our supply shocks are directly observable|through changes in the
price of the relevant inputs|while technological shocks are not.
Firms. We assume a continuum of monopolistically competitive ¯rms, each
producing a di®erentiated product and facing an isoelastic demand. The pro-
important cyclical variations in the size of aggregate distortions.
4duction function for each ¯rm is given by:
Y = M®N1¡® (2)
where Y is output, and M and N are the quantities of the two inputs hired by
the ¯rm (in order to keep the notation simple we ignore ¯rm-speci¯c and time
subscripts when not strictly needed).
Letting lower case letters denote the natural logarithms of the original variables,
the real marginal cost is given by:
mc = w ¡ mpn
= w ¡ (y ¡ n) ¡ log(1 ¡ ®) (3)
where w is the (log) real wage, assumed to be taken as given by each ¯rm.
Each good is non-storable and is sold to households, who consume it in the
same period. Hence, consumption of each good must equate output.
People. We assume a large number of identical households, with time separable
preferences, constant discount factor ¯, and period utility given by
U(C;N) = log(C) ¡ expf»g
N1+Á
1 + Á
where C is composite consumption (with elasticity of substitution between
goods equal to ²), N is employment, and » is a (possibly time-varying) prefer-
ence parameter.3
The implied marginal rate of substitution (in logs) is given by:
mrs = c + Án + » (4)
3. While our focus is on supply shocks, we introduce preference shocks for two reasons. First,
our (simplifying) assumption of a closed economy with no capital accumulation implies that
¯rst best employment is invariant to supply shocks (but not to preference shocks). Thus,
in the absence of preference shocks, the employment gap would coincide with employment.
Such nonrobust property could be misleading, especially in empirical applications. Secondly,
and as discussed below, the implications for output of strict in°ation targeting policies vary
considerably depending on whether preference or supply shocks are the relevent disturbance
at any point in time.
51.1 E±cient Allocation (First Best)
Let us start by assuming perfect competition in goods and labor markets. In
this case we have, from the ¯rms' side:
w = mpn (5)
= (y ¡ n) + log(1 ¡ ®)
and, from the consumer-workers' side:
w = mrs
= y + Án + » (6)
where we have imposed the market clearing condition c = y. Combining both
expressions yields the following expression for the ¯rst-best level of employment
n1 (we use the subscript \1" to denote values of variables associated with the
¯rst-best|or e±cient|allocation)
(1 + Á) n1 = log(1 ¡ ®) ¡ » (7)
Note that ¯rst-best employment does not depend on the endowment of the
non-produced input (because of exact cancellation of income and substitution
e®ects implied by log utility and Cobb-Douglas technology), but it is inversely
related to the preference shifter ». Given ¯rst-best employment, ¯rst-best out-
put, denoted by y1, is given by
y1 = ® m + (1 ¡ ®) n1 (8)
which, as expected, depends on both shocks.
1.2 Flexible Price Equilibrium (Second Best)
We maintain the assumption that prices and wages are °exible, but we take
into account the monopoly power of ¯rms in the goods market.
From the ¯rms' side, optimal price setting implies mc + ¹p = 0, where ¹p ´
log(²=(²¡1)) is the markup of price over cost, coming from the monopoly power
6of ¯rms. Hence, using (3)
w = y ¡ n + log(1 ¡ ®) ¡ ¹p (9)
Henceforth, we use subscript \2" to refer to the second-best (or natural) levels
of a variable, corresponding to the equilibrium with °exible prices. Combining
(6) and (9), we can determine second-best employment n2 :
(1 + Á) n2 = log(1 ¡ ®) ¡ ¹p ¡ » (10)
which, under our assumptions, is independent of m, but may vary as a result of
changes in the preference parameter ». Second-best output is in turn given by:
y2 = ® m + (1 ¡ ®) n2 (11)
Note an important implication of this baseline NK model: While both ¯rst- and
second-best output vary over time, the gap between the two remains constant
and given by




That property, which is common to the vast majority of optimizing models with
nominal rigidities found in the literature, will play an important role in what
follows.
1.3 Staggered Price Equilibrium
Assume now that price decisions are staggered µ a la Calvo. As is well known, in
that case, in a neighborhood of the zero-in°ation steady state, the behavior of
in°ation is described by the di®erence equation:
¼ = ¯ E¼(+1) + ¸ (mc + ¹p) (13)
where mc+¹p denotes the log-deviation of real marginal cost from its value in
a zero in°ation steady state, and ¸ ´ µ¡1(1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ ¯µ), with µ representing
the fraction of ¯rms not adjusting their price in any given period.4
4. See, e.g. Gal¶ ³ and Gertler (1999) for a derivation. An identical representation obtains
under the assumption of quadratic costs of price adjustment, as in Rotemberg (1982). In the
7Substituting (6) into (3) and using (10) and (11), we obtain:






Combining the previous two equations gives us the new Keynesian Phillips curve
(NKPC):
¼ = ¯E¼(+1) + · (y ¡ y2) (14)
where · ´ ¸(1 + Á)=(1 ¡ ®):
In°ation depends on expected in°ation and the output gap, de¯ned as the (log)
distance of output from its natural level. Note that neither supply nor preference
shocks appear directly in equation (14). They appear indirectly through their
e®ect on the natural level of output, y2, and thus through the output gap
(y ¡ y2).
Equation (14) implies that stabilizing in°ation is equivalent to stabilizing the
output gap (y ¡ y2). Now recall from (12) that (y1 ¡ y2) = ±. This implies
that stabilizing the output gap (y ¡ y2) is, in turn, equivalent to stabilizing
the welfare-relevant (log) distance between output and its ¯rst-best level, i.e.
(y ¡ y1). Putting the two steps together implies that stabilizing in°ation is
equivalent to stabilizing the welfare-relevant (log) distance of output from ¯rst
best. This is what we referred to as the divine coincidence in the introduction.
Note that the divine coincidence is a consequence of the constancy of ±, the
(log) distance between the ¯rst- and the second-best levels of output. In par-
ticular, because an adverse supply shock does not alter ±, it does not create
any incentives for the monetary authority to deviate from a policy of constant
in°ation.5
A number of recent papers have introduced a trade-o® between stabilization of
in°ation and stabilization of the distance between output and its ¯rst-best level
latter case coe±cient ¸ is related to the magnitude of price adjustment costs. See Roberts
(1995).
5. As this section ends, it may be useful to restate the semantic conventions we use in the
paper. We refer to the level of output which would prevail in the absence of imperfections
as the \e±cient" or \¯rst-best" level of output. We refer to the level of output which would
prevail in the absence of nominal rigidities as the \natural" or \second-best" level of output.
We refer to the log distance between the actual level of output and the second-best level of
output as the \output gap." We refer to the log distance between the actual level of output
and the ¯rst-best level of output as the \welfare-relevant output gap". Similar statements
apply to employment and employment gaps.
8by assuming (explicitly or implicitly) exogenous stochastic variations in ±, the
gap between ¯rst- and second-best output.6 We take a di®erent approach. By
introducing an additional real imperfection in the model, we get endogenous
°uctuations in the gap in response to shocks. We defer a discussion of the two
approaches to later.
2 Introducing Real Wage Rigidities
We assume that real wages respond sluggishly to labor market conditions, as a
result of some (unmodelled) imperfection or friction in labor markets. Speci¯-
cally, we assume the partial adjustment model:
w = ° w(¡1) + (1 ¡ °) mrs (15)
where ° can be interpreted as an index of real rigidities.7
We view equation (15) as an admittedly ad-hoc but parsimonious way of mod-
eling the slow adjustment of wages to labor market conditions, as found in a
variety of models of real wage rigidities, without taking a stand on what the
"right" model is.8 An alternative formalization, explicitly derived from stag-
gering of real wage decisions, is presented in Appendix 2. The algebra is more
complex, but the basic conclusions are the same as those presented in the text
below. The important assumption underlying equation (15) is that the slow
adjustment be the result of distortions rather than preferences, so the ¯rst-best
equilibrium is una®ected. 9
6. See Woodford (2004, section 4.5) for a general discussion of that approach.
7. In principle one would want to guarantee w ¸ mrs at all times, to prevent workers from
working more than desired, given the wage (as would be the case for example in a model where
wages set in bargaining vary over time, but always remain above the workers' reservation
wage). This would be easily achieved by introducing a (su±ciently large) positive steady state
wage markup, as in
w = °w(¡1) + (1 ¡ °)(¹w + mrs)
without altering any of the conclusions below, though at the cost of burdening the notation.
8. Other authors have adopted a similar assumption in order to model real wage rigidities.
Hence, Kai and Linzert (2005) propose an analogous partial adjustment model in the context
of a matching model in order to account for the response of unemployment and in°ation to
monetary policy shocks. Alternative, but related, formalizations of real wage rigidities can be
found in Felices (2005), in a model with variable e®ort and shirking, and Rabanal (2004), in
a model with rule-of-thumb wage setters.Other authors have adopted a similar assumption in
order to model real wage rigidities.
9. Danthine and Kurman (2005) develop a model in which a real wage rigidity of a very
9Next we examine the implications of real wage rigidities on the equilibrium level
of employment and in°ation. Once again we ¯nd it useful to start by looking
at the °exible price case.
2.1 Flexible Price Equilibrium (Second Best)
Assume that prices and wages are °exible, so we solve for the second-best level
of employment. Note that the ¯rst-best level is the same as before.
From above, using (4), (15), and our assumptions on technology (2), we have,
from the wage setting side:
w = ° w(¡1) + (1 ¡ °) (y + Án + »)
= ° w(¡1) + (1 ¡ °) [®(m ¡ n) + (1 + Á)n + »] (16)
As before, from the ¯rms' side:
w = mpn ¡ ¹p
= (y ¡ n) + log(1 ¡ ®) ¡ ¹p
= ®(m ¡ n) + log(1 ¡ ®) ¡ ¹p
Putting the two together and rearranging terms, we can solve for second-best
output y2 as a function of ¯rst-best output y1 (which remains unchanged, and
given by (7) and (8)) and the two exogenous driving forces:
[y2 ¡y1 +±] = £° [y2(¡1)¡y1(¡1)+±]+£°(1¡®)[¢m+(1+Á)¡1¢»] (17)
where £° ´ °®=(°® + (1 ¡ °)(1 + Á)) 2 [0;1].
Equation (17) points to the key implication of the introduction of real wage
rigidities: The gap between the ¯rst and second-best levels of output is no
longer constant, °uctuating instead in response to both preference and supply
shocks.
Note further that £° is increasing in °, implying that the size and persistence
of deviations of the gap between second- and ¯rst-best output are increasing
similar form arises as a result of non-standard preferences, which make the disutility of e®ort
a function of some "norm" which depends on the level and the change in the real wage. The
normative implications of such a model would be clearly di®erent from ours.
10in the degree of real rigidities. Hence, for instance, the e®ects of an adverse
supply shock (an unexpected decrease in m) are to decrease second-best output
by more than ¯rst-best output (the gap being increasing in °). Only gradually
does the size of that gap return to its steady state level ±, as the wage adjusts
over time. On the other hand, in response to a preference shock that lowers
¯rst-best output (an increase in »), second-best output falls by less, since the
assumed real rigidities prevent the wage from adjusting upward su±ciently to
support the lower e±cient level of employment and output.
2.2 Staggered Price Equilibrium
We can now solve for the behavior of in°ation under the assumption of price
staggering µ a la Calvo. Combining (2), (3), and (16), and rearranging terms we
obtain
(mc + ¹p) = (mc + ¹p)(¡1) + x2 (18)
where
x2 ´ (1 ¡ ®)¡1[(1 ¡ °)(1 + Á)(y ¡ y2) + °®(¢y ¡ ¢y2)]
is a linear combination of the current and lagged distance of output from second
best. Combining (18) with (13) yields:




This is the relation between in°ation and the output gap implied by our model.
Notice that as in the baseline NKPC model, it is still the case that there is an
exact relation|although with slightly more complex dynamics|between in°a-
tion, expected in°ation, and the output gap (now, both level and change). So
fully stabilizing in°ation is still consistent with fully stabilizing the ouput gap,
the distance of output from its second-best level: In equation (19), a constant
¼ implies a constant (y ¡ y2).10
But, in contrast with the baseline NKPC model, the divine coincidence no
longer holds, since stabilizing the output gap (y ¡ y2) is no longer desirable.
This is because what matters for welfare is the distance of output not from its
second-best level, but from its ¯rst-best level. In contrast to the baseline model,
10. More accurately, it implies a constant x2, which in turn implies an asymptotically constant
y ¡ y2.
11the distance between the ¯rst- and the second-best levels of output is no longer
constant, but is instead a®ected by the shocks, as we have shown above.
To see what this implies, combine (19) with (17) to obtain the relation between
in°ation and the distance of employment from its ¯rst-best level:






[¢m + (1 + Á)¡1¢» ] (20)
where now
x1 ´ (1 ¡ ®)¡1[(1 ¡ °)(1 + Á)(y ¡ y1 + ±) + °®(¢y ¡ ¢y1)]
involves a linear combination of the current and lagged welfare-relevant output
gap.
In°ation depends on expected in°ation, a distributed lag of the distance of
output from its ¯rst-best level, and a distributed lag of both supply and pref-
erence shocks. In other words, there is no longer an exact relation, however
complex, between in°ation and the welfare-relevant output gap. Thus, there is
no way to stabilize both in the presence of either supply or preference shocks,
and monetary policy faces a clear trade-o®.
To understand the basic source of the trade-o®, it is useful to look at the
economy's factor price frontier. Let v be the real price of the non-produced
input. Then, given the Cobb-Douglas assumption:
mc = (1 ¡ ®) w + ® v + const
Thus any shock that induces an increase in the real price of the non-produced
input (say, an increase in the price of oil) must lead either to a decrease in real
wages or an increase in real marginal cost. Depending on the degree of monetary
policy accommodation, the outcome will be re°ected in output or in°ation. This
can be seen clearly by deriving the in°ation equation, now expressed in terms
of ¢v and the distance of output from ¯rst-best (see appendix for derivation):
¼ = ¯ E¼(+1) +
¸
1 ¡ ¡L
[(1 ¡ ¡)(1 + Á)(1 ¡ ®)¡1 (y ¡ y1 + ±) + ¡® ¢v] (21)
where ¡ ´
°
1¡®(1¡°) 2 [0;1] is a monotonic transformation of the index of real
12wage rigidities °.
Consider now any shock that drives up the real price of the non produced input,
v.11 Stabilizing in°ation requires a proportional decline in the real wage; given
real wage rigidity, this can only be delivered by a decrease in output relative to
¯rst best. Stabilizing instead the distance of output from ¯rst best will lead to
higher in°ation. We explore this trade-o® further in the next section.
3 Policy Tradeo®s
To illustrate the implications of the trade o® faced by the monetary authority, it
is easiest to look at two extreme policies. For convenience, we assume » = 0 and
a random walk process for the non-labor input endowment, so that ¢m = "m is
a white noise process. Note that, in this case, ¯rst-best employment is constant.
Suppose that the central bank stabilizes the welfare-relevant output gap (the
distance of output from ¯rst best) at a level consistent with zero average in°a-
tion. That requires y = y1 ¡ ± at all times. It follows from (20) that:




Solving under rational expectations gives:




So, stabilizing the welfare-relevant output gap implies some accommodation of
adverse shocks through in°ation, followed by a slow (if ° is high) return to
normal.
Suppose instead that the central bank stabilizes in°ation, so ¼ = E¼(+1). Then:
(1 ¡ °)(1 + Á)(y ¡ y1 + ±) + °®(¢y ¡ ¢y1) ¡ °®(1 ¡ ®) "m = 0
11. Note that v is endogenous in our framework, and so an increase in v may come from either
a negative supply shock (a drop in m) or a preference shock that brings down the marginal
disutility of labor (a drop in »).
13Or equivalently:
(y ¡ y1) = ¡(1 ¡ £°)± + £° [y(¡1) ¡ y1(¡1)] + (1 ¡ ®)£°"m
Not surprisingly, this policy replicates the second best, with large °uctuations
in output relative to ¯rst best.
To the extent that the central bank attaches some weight to stabilization of
both in°ation and the gap from ¯rst best, optimal policy will be somewhere
in between. The important point is that, so long as the central bank puts
some weight on activity, it may have to accommodate adverse supply shocks
through potentially large and long lasting increases in in°ation. How long lasting
depends on the degree of real wage rigidity, °. How large depends also on °, but
also on ¸, the degree of nominal rigidity, and ®, the share of the non-produced
input in production.
To get a sense of the order of magnitude of the implied movements in in°ation
and the welfare-relevant output gap, we compute the elasticity of those variables
with respect to v, which we can interpret as the real price of oil, under the two
extreme policies just described (and given the assumption of a random walk
process for the endowment m).
















(1 ¡ ¯°)(®° + (1 ¡ ®))
Letting ¯ ' 1, and assuming an average price duration of six months (Bils and
Klenow (2003)), we have ¸ ' 0:5.12 We set the share of oil in production, ®,
to 0:025. As a benchmark, we assume ° = 0:9, which implies a half-life for the
adjustment of the real wage adjustment of 6 quarters.
12. Empirical estimates of ¸ are often much smaller (See for example Gal¶ ³ and Gertler (1998)).
For the purposes of the present exercise we take our model literally and use the implied value
of ¸.
14Under these assumptions we obtain @¼
@v ' 0:11. Hence, stabilizing the welfare-
relevant output gap in response to an adverse supply shock which raises the
price of oil by, say, 10 percent, implies an (annualized) in°ation slightly above 4
percent on impact. Note however that the expression for @¼
@v is highly non-linear
in °. Hence, if we set ° = 0:8 we have @¼
@v = 0:05 , bringing the impact on
short run in°ation of the same oil price hike down to 2 percent. If ° = 0:5 then
@¼
@v = 0:012, and in°ation is contained below 0:5 percent.13
Let us consider next the quantitative impact on the welfare-relevant output
gap of the second extreme policy analyzed above, i.e. one that fully stabilizes








(1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ £°)
= ¡
®°
(1 ¡ °)(1 + Á)
Under our baseline calibration (with ° = 0:9) and assuming a unit Frisch labor
supply elasticity (Á = 1) we have
@(y¡y1)
@v = ¡0:11, thus implying a reduction in
the welfare-relevant output gap in the ¯rst quarter of 1:1 percent in response
to a 10 rise in the price of oil, with the persistence of that deviation (measured
by the AR parameter £°) being relatively small: 0:10. When we set ° = 0:8 we
obtain a 0:5 percent output gap loss on impact with persistence 0:05. If ° = 0:5,
the corresponding numbers are 0:1 percent and 0:01.
While these numbers are rough and purely illustrative, they suggest a far from
quantitatively trivial policy trade-o® resulting from the presence of real wage
rigidities.
4 Real Wage Rigidities and the Cost of Disin°ations
The analysis above has stressed the role of real wage rigidities in generating a
meaningful policy trade-o® in response to shocks. Here we brie°y discuss their
13. Notice that the expression we derive corresponds to the short run multiplier, and does
not take into account subsequent changes in v, though the latter are small (more especi¯cally,
dv(+k)=d"m = ¡®°
k for k = 1;2;:::)
15implications for the output cost of disin°ations.14
As is well known, the standard NKPC implies the presence of a long run trade-
o®, however small, between in°ation and the output gap.15 To illustrate this
point, consider a sudden, permanent, unexpected reduction in in°ation from,
say, ¼¤ > 0 to zero. From (14) it follows that, in the standard NK model, this
















for k = 0;1;2;:::
In the standard NK model, the real e®ects of disin°ations mentioned above
tend to be small, at least for plausible parameter values. Assuming for example
¯ = 0:99, µ = 0:75, Á = 1 and ® = 0:025, we have dy = ¡0:05 ¼¤ and dw ' 0:1
¼¤. Hence, a permanent reduction in in°ation of 5 percentage points lowers the
level of output at all horizons by 0:25 percentage points, while the real wage
declines by 0:1 percentage points.
Consider next the case with real wage rigidities. Starting from an identical
steady state with in°ation ¼¤, equations (13) and (18) imply that in the period
immediately after the (assumed to be successful) implementation of price sta-
bility, output and real wages are at their natural levels. However, in the period
when disin°ation takes place, things are di®erent since, in order to decrease the
real wage to the level consistent with price stability, the central bank needs to
engineer a much larger recession. To be speci¯c, the decline in output required






14. We are grateful to Greg Mankiw for raising the question that stimulated the present
analysis.
15. See King and Wolman (1996) for a detailed discussion of the steady state in the standard
new Keynesian model.
16. Intuitively, the reduction in output comes from the increase in average markups. Calvo
price-setting implies that the higher the in°ation rate, the lower are average markups. Thus,
lower in°ation leads to an increase in average markups|equivalently a decrease in real wages|
, so a decrease in labor supply, and thus a decrease in output.
16The output loss is increasing, in a highly non-linear way, with °, the index
of real wage rigidities. Assuming for example ° = 0:9, the short-run output
loss resulting from any given disin°ation is multiplied by a factor of 10. Under
the simple calibration proposed above, moving from 5 percent in°ation to zero
in°ation now implies a short run output loss of 2:5 percentage points, a non
negligible value.
5 Alternative Approaches
We are not the ¯rst to confront the divine coincidence and to o®er a resolu-
tion. There are at least two alternative approaches: distortion shocks and more
complex nominal wage and price setting.17
5.1 Distortion Shocks
A frequently used approach has been to simply append an exogenous distur-
bance to the NKPC, call it a \cost-push" shock, and thus create a trade-o®
between in°ation stabilization and output gap stabilization (for example, Clar-
ida, Gal¶ ³ and Gertler (1999)).
Taken at face value, this is a ¯x, not an acceptable solution: One needs to
know where this additional disturbance comes from, and why it belongs to
the equation. As we have seen, conventional supply shocks do not appear as
disturbances in the baseline NKPC.
A number of authors however have shown that a potential justi¯cation for
this approach is to assume the presence of exogenous \distortion shocks", for
example variations in tax changes, or changes in desired markups by ¯rms (see
for example Smets and Wouters (2003), Steinsson (2003), and Clarida, Gal¶ ³ and
Gertler (2001)). Such shocks do not a®ect the relation between in°ation and the
output gap, the distance of output from its second-best value; they do however
a®ect the distance of second-best output|which is a®ected by the shock|and
17. ** As discussed in the introduction, models of endogenous desired markups along the lines
of those developed by Rotemberg and Woodford (1996, 1998) would also eliminate the divine
coincidence, very much for the same reason our real wage rigidity assumption does. Rotemberg
and Woodford restricted their analysis to the real implications of endogenous markups, without
exploring their consequences for in°ation and monetary policy in the presence of nominal
frictions.
17¯rst-best output|which, by assumption, is not a®ected by the shock. Thus,
they create a trade-o® between stabilization of in°ation and stabilization of the
welfare-relevant output gap.
Such distortion shocks do probably exist, and, with respect to these shocks, the
divine coincidence no longer holds. But it still holds with respect to standard
supply shocks, such as movements in the price of oil or technology shocks. Thus
the model extended in this way still implies that keeping in°ation constant in
the face of increases in the price of oil is the right policy|a proposition which,
again, seems implausible.
5.2 Alternative Structures of Wage and Price Setting
Yet another approach aimed at removing the divine coincidence has been to ex-
plore the implications of alternative structures of wage and price setting. Erceg,
Henderson, and Levin (2000; EHL, henceforth) in particular have shown that
if both wage decisions and price decisions are staggered µ a la Calvo, the relation
between price in°ation and the output gap no longer holds exactly, implying a
trade o® between price in°ation stabilization and output gap stabilization.
To assess their argument, consider the baseline model of Section 1, but now
with staggered price and wage setting µ a la Calvo, as in EHL.
Given our assumptions, wage in°ation is described by the di®erence equation:
¼w = ¯E¼w(+1) ¡ ¸w(w ¡ mrs ¡ ¹w)
= ¯E¼w(+1) ¡ ¸w(w ¡ ®m ¡ (1 ¡ ® + Á)n ¡ » ¡ ¹w)







where w2 and y2 are, respectively, the natural levels of the real wage and out-
put (now de¯ned as those that would obtain under both °exible prices and
wages). ¹w is a constant desired wage markup, and ¸w is a coe±cient which
is a function of structural parameters, including the Calvo parameter indexing
the probability that any individual wage is reset in a given period (see EHL for
details).
18Price in°ation, now denoted by ¼p, is given by:
¼p = ¯E¼p(+1) + ¸p(mc + ¹p)
= ¯E¼p(+1) + ¸p(w ¡ ®m + ®n ¡ log(1 ¡ ®) + ¹p)




Note that neither wage nor price in°ation depends only on the output gap. In
both cases, in°ation depends on the output gap and the distance of the wage
from the natural wage. Thus, the divine coincidence does not apply, either with
respect to price in°ation, or with respect to wage in°ation.
Let us de¯ne however the composite in°ation rate ¼ ´ (¸w¼p+¸p¼w)=(¸w+¸p).
It follows from the de¯nition that:
¼ = ¯E¼(+1) + · (y ¡ y2) (22)
where now · ´
¸w¸p(1+Á)
(¸w+¸p)(1¡®).
Given that, in the EHL model, the distance between ¯rst- and second-best
output is given by
y1 ¡ y2 =
¹ (1 ¡ ®)
1 + Á
´ ±
where ¹ ´ ¹p + ¹w, we can rewrite (22) as:
¼ = ¯E¼(+1) + · (y ¡ y1 + ±)
Hence the divine coincidence emerges again, though in a di®erent guise: Stabiliz-
ing the distance of output from ¯rst best is equivalent to stabilizing a weighted
average of wage and price in°ation.
What are the policy implications of this weaker form of the divine coincidence?
As shown by EHL, the utility-based loss function needed to evaluate alternative
policies is a weighted average of the squares of the output gap, price in°ation
and wage in°ation. In this context strict price in°ation targeting is generally
suboptimal, and often involves welfare losses that are several times larger than
other, better designed policies. Interestingly, while strict output gap stabiliza-
tion (and hence stabilization of the composite in°ation index) is exactly optimal
only for a speci¯c parameter con¯guration, EHL conclude that it is nearly op-
19timal for a large range of parameter values (see also Woodford (2003), Chapter
6). Hence, and for all practical purposes, a meaningful policy tradeo® is also
missing in the EHL model.
6 The Behavior of In°ation
Beyond its normative implications, our model has implications for the behav-
ior of in°ation which appear more consistent with the data than those of the
standard NK model. This is the topic of this section.
6.1 In°ation Inertia
Equation (14) implies that in°ation will not outlive any variation in the output
gap. Closing the latter will be su±cient to stabilize in°ation fully and with no
delay.
This is no longer the case under our proposed modi¯cation of the NK model.
As equation (19) shows, in the presence of real wage rigidities (° > 0) any
change in the output gap, even if purely transitory, will have persistent e®ects
on in°ation. The reason is simple: Any change in the workers' reservation wage
resulting from a change in output (and thus a change in employment), will a®ect
the real wage (and hence real marginal cost) only gradually, with that e®ect
outliving the eventual return of output to its natural level.
To illustrate this point, consider the limiting case where the output gap follows













Note how in°ation inertia is increasing in °. For ° = 0|that is, in the absence
or real wage rigidities|in°ation is white noise, just like the output gap. For
° close to one, in°ation exhibits considerable inertia, despite the lack of serial
correlation in the output gap.18
18. The result that, in the absence of real rigidities, the persistence of in°ation is equal to that
of the output gap is not a general proposition. A counterexample is given in Rotemberg (2005),
whom we thank for correcting us on this point. What is true in general is that persistence
increases with °.
20The previous point can also be illustrated by using a representation of in°ation
dynamics more closely linked to the empirical in°ation equations found in the











x2 + ³ (23)
where ³ ´ [(¯°)=(1 + ¯°)] (¼ ¡ E(¼j ¡ 1)) is white noise and x2 is de¯ned as
above.
Note that this equation takes a form very similar to the hybrid NKPC spec-
i¯cations used in many empirical and policy analysis applications, and which
allow for both backward-looking and forward-looking in°ation terms (with co-
e±cients whose sum is close to one, as is the case here).19 In our model, the
relative weight of lagged in°ation is tightly linked to the degree of real wage
rigidities. Thus, as ° increases from 0 to 1, the coe±cient on past in°ation
rises from 0 to 1=(1 + ¯), which is slightly greater than 1/2; the coe±cient on
expected in°ation declines from ¯ to ¯=(1+¯), which is slightly less than 1/2.
The previous discussion provides a potential explanation for the signi¯cance of
lagged in°ation in estimates of hybrid versions of the NKPC. Yet, we do not
feel fully comfortable in relating equation (23) to much of the existing empirical
work. The reason is that (23) is not directly estimable since the natural level of
output, and by implication the output gap, is not observable (a point stressed
by Gal¶ ³ and Gertler [1999]). We view the ad-hoc measures of the output gaps
used in the literature (which approximate the natural levels by some smooth
function of time) with some suspicion.
Fortunately, our model implies a representation of the in°ation equation that
can be taken to the data. Perhaps surprisingly, the representation turns out
to be fairly close to the traditional Phillips curve equation relating in°ation
to lagged in°ation, the unemployment rate, and a supply shock indicator (as
estimated for example by Gordon (1997) among others.)
19. See, e.g. Fuhrer and Moore (1997), or Orphanides and Williams (2005).
216.2 In°ation and Unemployment
In order to derive the in°ation-unemployment relation implied by our model we
proceed in two steps:
The ¯rst is to explicitly introduce unemployment. To do so, let ns be implicitly
de¯ned by
w = y + Á ns + »
Note that ns measures the quantity of labor households would want to supply
given the current wage and marginal utility of income.20 Accordingly, de¯ne
the (involuntary) rate of unemployment, u, as the (log) deviation between the
desired supply of labor and actual employment:
u ´ ns ¡ n
Clearly, in the absence of wage rigidities (° = 0) there is no involuntary un-
employment as the wage is always equal to the marginal rate of substitution of






Hence, in our model with real wage rigidities, a rate of unemployment above
(below) some constant (implicitly normalized to zero) induces a downward (up-
ward) adjustment of real wages. This adjustment goes on as long as the unem-
ployment rate deviates from zero, with the size of the implied response being
inversely related to °, our index of real rigidities, but positively related to Á,
the slope of the labor supply.
The second step consists in rewriting the in°ation equation (19) in terms of
unemployment, and of the price rather than the quantity of the non-produced













¢v + ³ (24)
In°ation is a function of past and expected future in°ation, of the unemploy-
ment rate, and of the change in the real price of the non-produced input. As
20. Note that the two conditioning variables y and n generally di®er from what they would
be in a ¯rst-best equilibrium, which explains why, in general, ns 6= n1
22in equation (23) earlier, the term ³ is proportional to (¼ ¡ E(¼j ¡ 1)) and so
is white noise, orthogonal to all variables at t ¡ 1.21 Except for the presence of
expected future in°ation, this speci¯cation is indeed quite close to traditional
speci¯cations of the Phillips curve, which typically include changes in the price
of oil and other supply side factors in addition to unemployment on the right
hand side. 22
Equation (24) can be estimated using instrumental variables. To do so, we use
annual U.S. data on in°ation (measured by the percent change in the GDP
de°ator), the civilian unemployment rate, and the percent change in the PPI
raw materials index (relative to the GDP de°ator). Our instrument set consists
of four lags of the previous three variables. The sample period is 1960-2004.











which accords, at least qualitatively, with (24). In particular, all the estimated
coe±cients have the right sign and are statistically signi¯cant. Furthermore,
the theoretical restriction that the sum of coe±cients on lagged and expected
in°ation equals one cannot be rejected at the 5 percent level (though not by










which again matches well the theoretical speci¯cation, though the coe±cients
on unemployment and raw materials prices are only signi¯cant at the 10 percent
level. The coe±cients on past and expected future in°ation imply a value for
¯ of 0.92. The other structural coe±cients are not identi¯ed and cannot be
recovered (they would be if we estimated the full model, something we have not
done).
21. Note that, in contrast with the representation (23), the coe±cients on lagged and expected
in°ation are independent of the degree of real wage rigidities, as measured by °. Instead, that
parameter has an in°uence on the size of the unemployment coe±cient. Of course, in a full
°edged general equilibrium model it would have an in°uence on the path of unemployment
itself.
22. See, for example, Gordon (1997), or Blanchard and Katz (1999).
236.3 Alternative approaches
Here again, we are not the ¯rst to o®er potential solutions to the lack of in-
°ation inertia implied by the standard NK model. Three sets of alternative
explanations, di®erent from ours, can be found in the literature:23
Lagged indexation. A simple way of generating in°ation inertia has been to
simply append a lagged in°ation term to the NKPC, thus giving rise to what
has been known as the hybrid NKPC. Taken at face value, this is again just
a ¯x, not an acceptable solution. Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005),
Smets and Wouters (2003), and Steinsson (2004), among others, have shown
however that such a formulation can be derived from automatic indexation of
prices to past in°ation by the ¯rms that are not re-optimizing prices in any given
period. We also see this as an unconvincing ¯x, with little basis in fact: none
of the existing micro-studies of price setting uncover any form of mechanical
indexation to past in°ation; instead the prices of individual goods appear to
remain unchanged for several months, even quarters in some cases (see, e.g.
Dhyne et al. [2005]).24
Relative wage concerns. In a well known paper, Fuhrer and Moore (1995)
have argued that one gets in°ation persistence in a model of wage staggering if
one assumes that wage setters care about their real wage relative to the real wage
of other workers over the period during which their own nominal wage is ¯xed.
Holden and Driscoll (2003) have shown however that in°ation persistence in
the Fuhrer-Moore speci¯cation comes in fact from the assumption that workers
care about the real wages of workers in the previous period. In this sense, the
results from Fuhrer and Moore come from an assumption similar to ours, the
assumption that real wages this period depend, to some extent, on real wages
last period.
23. A fourth set of papers adopt an approach closer to ours in showing how di®erent types
of labor market imperfections a®ect the dynamics of in°ation. A non-exhaustive list includes
Trigari (2004), Walsh (2004), Rabanal (2004), Danthine and Kurmann (2004), Felices (2005),
Kraus and Lubik (2005), among others. The analysis in those papers typically focuses on the
e®ects of labor market frictions (of di®erent types) on the persistence of the in°ation and
output responses to an exogenous monetary policy shock.
24. The version of the hybrid NKPC proposed by Gal¶ ³ and Gertler (1999) which assumes a
fraction of rule-of-thumb, backward-looking price setters overcomes that problem, since those
¯rms are assumed to adjust their prices only occasionally, as conventional Calvo ¯rms.
24Sticky information: Mankiw and Reis (2002) have proposed a model in which
¯rms adjust prices every period, according to a pre-speci¯ed plan, but revise
that plan infrequently. Accordingly, current in°ation is the result of decisions
based on news about future demand and cost conditions obtained in previous
periods, in addition to current news. A consequence of that \distributed lag"
property is the emergence of inertia in in°ation. Again, we view that explanation
as one at odds with the micro evidence: Firms do not seem to adjust their
prices continuously according to a pre-speci¯ed plan; instead they typically
keep prices unchanged for long periods of time. Furthermore, recent survey-
based evidence suggests that ¯rms review their prices more often than they
change them, exactly the opposite to what is assumed by sticky information
models (see Fabiani et al. (2004)).
7 Conclusions
The standard new Keynesian framework is often criticized for its lack of a
trade-o® between in°ation and output gap stabilization and the radical nor-
mative implications that arise from it. In the present paper we have argued
that the introduction of real wage rigidities is a natural way to overcome that
shortcoming. We have proposed a tractable modi¯cation of the new Keyne-
sian framework that incorporates these real wage rigidities and generates more
realistic policy trade-o®s.
Our model can also account for some aspects of the empirical behavior of in-
°ation that are often viewed as inconsistent with the standard NK model. In
particular, we show how the presence of real wage rigidities becomes a source
of in°ation inertia, implying a degree of in°ation persistence beyond that in-
herited from output gap °uctuations. In addition, our model yields a simple
representation of in°ation as a function of lagged and expected in°ation, the
unemployment rate and the change in the price of non-produced inputs. When
we estimate that relation using annual postwar US data, we ¯nd that it ¯ts the
data pretty well. The latter result may not be very surprising given that the
resulting empirical equation is not too di®erent from some of the ad-hoc speci-
¯cations that other authors have used in the older Phillips curve literature. A
key di®erence lies in the relevance (con¯rmed empirically) of a forward-looking
component in the determination of in°ation, a feature emphasized by the more
25recent literature. In a sense, our framework helps bridge the gap between the
old and new Phillips curve literatures in a way that is consistent with the micro-
evidence on price setting.
There are several avenues that we plan to pursue, building on the framework
developed in the present paper.
On the theoretical front, we want to dig deeper and explore microfoundations
for real wage rigidity, and their implications for optimal monetary policy. Micro
foundations, based for example on shirking (Felices 2005), on rule-of-thumb
wage setters (Rabanal 2004), or on bargaining (Hall 2005) may lead to more
substantial departures from the NK benchmark than we have allowed for here.
The formalization o®ered by Hall for example implies modifying not only the
real wage equation, but also the speci¯cation of labor demand: In his model,
the real wage rigidity a®ects only the rents going to workers and ¯rms, and thus
only the rate of job creation.
On the empirical front, we plan to estimate a model of joint wage and price
in°ation dynamics that combines both nominal and real rigidities in wage set-
ting. We also plan to conduct a quantitative analysis of the optimal monetary
policy response to a change in the price of oil or other raw materials, as a func-
tion of alternative assumptions about the degree of real wage rigidities and the
persistence of the shock.
More generally, we hope our paper contributes to raise macroeconomists' aware-
ness of the likely interactions between aggregate shocks and distortions, and of
the implications of these interactions for optimal macroeconomic policy.
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29Appendix 1: Derivation of Alternative Representations of In-
°ation Dynamics in the Presence of Real Wage Rigidities
Throughout this appendix we assume the marginal cost and wage setting sched-
ules:
mc + ¹p = w ¡ mpn + ¹p
w = °w(¡1) + (1 ¡ °)mrs
as well as the in°ation equation implied by Calvo staggered price setting:
¼ = ¯E¼(+1) + ¸(mc + ¹p) (25)
Representation #1: in terms of the gap between actual and second-
best output.
Combining the wage schedule with (2) and (4)
w = °w(¡1) + (1 ¡ °)(®m + (1 ¡ ® + Á)n + »)
which can be combined with the marginal cost schedule to yield
mc+¹p = °(mc(¡1)+¹p)+(1¡°)(»¡log(1¡®))+(1¡°)(1+Á)n¡°®(¢m¡¢n)
Setting mc = mc(¡1) = ¡¹p (°exible price assumption):
0 = (1 ¡ °)(» ¡ log(1 ¡ ®)) + (1 ¡ °)(1 + Á)n2 ¡ °®(¢m ¡ ¢n2)
which can be subtracted from the equation immediately above to yield:
mc + ¹p = °(mc(¡1) + ¹p) + (1 ¡ °)(1 + Á)(n ¡ n2) + °®(¢n ¡ ¢n2)
Finally, we combine the previous di®erence equation for real marginal cost with
the Calvo equation (25) and rewrite in terms of output to obtain:

















where x2 ´ 1




Representation #2: in terms of the gap between actual and ¯rst-best
output, and underlying exogenous shocks.
Combining the wage schedule with (2) and (4)
w = °w(¡1) + (1 ¡ °)(®m + (1 ¡ ® + Á)n + »)
which can be combined with the marginal cost schedule to yield
mc+¹p = °(mc(¡1)+¹p)+(1¡°)(»¡log(1¡®))+(1¡°)(1+Á)n¡°®(¢m¡¢n)
Using the expression for ¯rst-best employment, we can rewrite the previous
di®erence equation in terms of the welfare relevant employment gap and the
underlying shocks:
mc+¹p = °(mc(¡1)+¹p)+(1¡°)(1+Á)(n¡n1+±)+°®(¢n¡¢n1)¡°®[¢m+(1+Á)¡1¢»]




















°®(¢m + (1 + Á)¡1¢») + ³
31Representation #3: in terms of the gap between actual and ¯rst-best
output, and the real price of non-produced input.
Combining the wage schedule with (2) and (4)
w = °w(¡1) + (1 ¡ °)(®(m ¡ n) + (1 + Á)n + »)
Using the fact that m ¡ n = (w ¡ v) + log(®=1 ¡ ®), as implied by cost mini-
mization:
w = °w(¡1) + (1 ¡ °)(®(w ¡ v) + ®log(®=1 ¡ ®) + (1 + Á)n + »)
Rearranging terms:
w = ¡ w(¡1) + (1 ¡ ¡)(1 ¡ ®)¡1 (®log(®=1 ¡ ®) ¡ ®v + +(1 + Á)n + ») (26)
where ¡ ´
°
1¡®(1¡°) 2 [0;1] is a monotonic transformation of the index of real
wage rigidities °.
Note also that
mc + ¹p = w ¡ ®(m ¡ n) ¡ log(1 ¡ ®) + ¹p
= w ¡ ®(w ¡ v) ¡ ®log® ¡ (1 ¡ ®)log(1 ¡ ®) + ¹p
= (1 ¡ ®) w + ® v ¡ ®log® ¡ (1 ¡ ®)log(1 ¡ ®) + ¹p (27)
which is a version of the factor price frontier (allowing for variable markups).
Thus we see that an increase in the real price of the endowment input (in-
dependently of the source, in principle any shock may do), will create both
downward pressure on real wages and upward pressure on marginal costs and,
hence, in°ation.
Combining (26) and (27) we obtain (after some algebra):
mc + ¹p = ¡ (mc(¡1) + ¹p) + (1 ¡ ¡)(1 + Á) (n ¡ n1 + ±) + ¡® ¢v (28)
We can now rewrite in°ation as
¼ = ¯ E¼(+1) +
¸
1 ¡ ¡L
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Representation #4: in terms of the unemployment rate and the real
price of the non-produced input.
First we derive a simple relationship between marginal cost, the unemployment
rate (de¯ned as above), and the employment gap:
mc + ¹p = w ¡ (y ¡ n) ¡ log(1 ¡ ®) + ¹p
= (y + Áns + ») ¡ (y ¡ n) ¡ log(1 ¡ ®) + ¹p
= Á (u ¡ un) + (1 + Á)(n ¡ n1 + ±)
We use the previous expression to substitute for (n ¡ n1 + ±) in the expression
for real marginal cost in (28):
mc + ¹p = ¡ (mc(¡1) + ¹p) + (1 ¡ ¡) [mc + ¹p ¡ Á u] + ¡® ¢v
After rearranging terms we obtain the di®erence equation:
mc = mc(¡1) ¡
(1 ¡ °)(1 ¡ ®)Á
°
u + ® ¢v
which is well de¯ned only if ° > 0 (notice that as ° approaches 0 so does u).














33Appendix 2: A Model with Staggered Real Wage Setting
Consider an economy with staggered wage setting and full indexation. Each
period a fraction 1 ¡ ° of workers, drawn randomly from the population, reset
their wage. The log-linearized law of motion for the aggregate real wage is thus
given by
wt = °wt¡1 + (1 ¡ °)w¤
t
where w¤
t denotes the newly set wage in period t. Utility maximization implies
the following wage setting rule (up to ¯rst order, and ignoring a constant term):
w¤




= (1 ¡ ¯°)
1 X
k=0






(mrst + ²wÁ wt)
where mrst+kjt denotes the marginal rate of substitution for a worker who last
set its wage in period t.25
Combining both equations we obtain
w = © w(¡1) + ©¯ Etfw(+1)g + ¤ mrs (29)
where © ´
(1+²wÁ)°
1+°[²wÁ(1+¯)+¯°] and ¤ ´
(1¡¯°)(1¡°)
1+°[²wÁ(1+¯)+¯°]. Notice that 1 = ©(1 +
¯) + ¤ thus implying that in the steady state w = mrs.
Let e w ´ w1 ¡ w2 and g mrs ´ mrs1 ¡ mrs2. Using the fact that w1 = mrs1 we
can write
e w = © e w(¡1) + ©¯ E e w(+1) + ¤ g mrs + © z (30)
25. The second equality uses the fact that the marginal rate of substitution for a worker
who last set its wage in period t, denoted by mrst+kjt, is related to its average counterpart
according to
mrst+kjt = mrst+k ¡ ²wÁ(w
¤
t+k ¡ wt+k)
where ²w is the wage elasticity of labor demand for a particular worker, under the assumption
of imperfect substitutability between workers in production.
34where
z ´ (1 + ¯)w1 ¡ w1(¡1) ¡ ¯Ew1(+1)
= ¢w1 ¡ ¯E¢w1(+1)
and where
¢w1 = ¢mpn1
= ®(¢m ¡ ¢n1)
= ®[¢m ¡ (1 + Á)¡1¢»]
is a function of the exogenous shocks (and as a result so is z).
Notice also that e w = mpn1 ¡ mpn2 = ¡ ®
1¡® e y and g mrs = (1 +
Á
1¡®) e y , where
e y ´ y1 ¡ y2 . Using these results we can rewrite (30) as:
e y = ®©¨ e y(¡1) + ®¯©¨ Ee y(+1) ¡ (1 ¡ ®)©¨ z
where ¨ ´ 1
®+¤(1¡®+Á). Thus, to the extent that real wage rigidities are present
(° > 0), we will have © > 0 and hence °uctuations in the gap between ¯rst and
second best output in response to shocks.
Next we derive the implied in°ation equation. Notice that real marginal cost is
given by




(y ¡ m) ¡ log(1 ¡ ®)
In terms of deviations from the °exible price equilibrium we have:




Notice that we can also rewrite (29) in terms of deviations from the °exible
price equilibrium values:
w ¡ w2 = © (w ¡ w2)(¡1) + ©¯ E(w ¡ w2)(+1) + ¤ (1 +
Á
1 ¡ ®
) (y ¡ y2)
35Collecting results we obtain
mc + ¹ = © (mc + ¹)(¡1) + ©¯ E(mc + ¹)(+1) + f(y ¡ y2)
where








Combined with in°ation equation (13) we obtain:
¼ = ¯E¼(+1) + ¸E(1 ¡ ©L ¡ ¯©L¡1)f(y ¡ y2)
= ¯E¼(+1) + ¸E(1 ¡ ©L ¡ ¯©L¡1)f(y ¡ y1) + u
where u ´ ¸E(1 ¡ ©L ¡ ¯©L¡1)f(y1 ¡ y2).
Notice that there is no trade-o® between stabilization of the output gap y ¡y2
and stabilization of in°ation. However, when ° > 0 , u will °uctuate in response
to shocks, making it impossible to stabilize both in°ation and the welfare-
relevant ouput gap.
36